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Responsible research and innovation: building knowledge arenas for glocal
sustainability research
Marian Deblonde*
Unit Sustainable Materials Management, VITO (Flemish Institute for Technological Research), Mol,
Belgium
(Received 9 May 2014; accepted 18 December 2014)
In knowledge economies, the prevailing belief is that research and innovation are crucial for
societal progress. The call for ‘responsible’ research and innovation is, however, an
indication that the link between science and technology on the one hand and societal
progress on the other is less unequivocal than many would like to think. This article
wonders why the relationship between knowledge economies and ‘responsible’ research and
innovation is not self-evident. It, consequently, proposes glocal sustainability research
(GSR) – and an appropriate process architecture for GSR – as a translation of responsible
research and innovation (RRI) and it suggests a type of knowledge arena – and some
institutional preconditions for its institutionalisation – as a breeding ground for RRI.
Keywords: responsible research and innovation; knowledge economies; glocal sustainability
research; knowledge arena
Introduction
The European Commission pleads for responsible research and innovation (RRI) in order to
respond more effectively and urgently to the grand societal challenges, such as climate change,
ageing population, food, water, materials and energy safety, public health, and security (European
Commission 2013; von Schomberg 2013, 51–74). Why this plea? In the ﬁrst part of this article,
this call for ‘responsibility’ is linked to the observation that the sustainability performance of
knowledge economies leaves, indeed, much to be desired and this despite the fact that knowledge
economies dispose of huge amounts of scientiﬁc knowledge and technological know-how. It, con-
sequently, looks for possible reasons for this astonishing observation. In the second part, it pro-
vides some preconditions for research and innovation systems to become ‘responsible’, namely
(a) taking local needs, values, and opportunities as starting points to consider which combinations
of new and old disciplinary and practical knowledge and know-how are appropriate to respond
effectively to local manifestations of global challenges and (b) checking whether this normative
content complies with global ethical principles of strong sustainability, equality, and a-growth, for
example, as deﬁned in the Open Working Group proposal for Sustainable Development goals
(http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgsproposal, consulted 15/12/2014). Finally, it puts a par-
ticular type of knowledge arena (Cornell et al. 2013, 60–70) forward as a breeding ground for
RRI.
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The sustainability performance of knowledge economies
Sustainable development became a global challenge as a consequence of human overconsump-
tion. This overconsumption is due to globalising industrial and industrialising economies that
are founded on a coercion for rapid monetary growth (Lietaer et al. 2012; Rees 2006, 220–
225), but also on dominant sociocultural norms and expectations of late-modern ‘developed’
and ‘developing’ societies. Sustainable development will, hence, only be feasible in case (1)
industrial and industrialising economies drastically reduce their use and consumption of natural
resources, (2) nations are prepared to a fair distribution of their welfare, both nationally and inter-
nationally, and (3) citizens develop a new vision on human and planetary well-being (Peeters
2012, 287–298). In the words of Hans Bruyninckx, director of the European Environment
Agency: ‘The concept of a green economy requires us to reformulate fundamentally the way
we produce, consume and live in a way so that our economic activities do not harm human
health and the environment’ (Bruyninckx 2014).
Globalising industrialised and industrialising economies do not, indeed, perform very well
with respect to sustainable development, or according to its ecological or its socio-economic
dimension (Rees 2006, 220–225).
Knowledge economies’ ecological dimension
According to the European Environment Agency, total use of natural resources and production of
waste increased by 34% between 2000 and 2007 and these increases are related to economic
growth and increasing welfare. These increases have a considerable economic and ecological
impact. Since easily accessible stocks nearly get exhausted, Europe is forced to seek mineral
stocks that are less concentrated and less easy to access and fuels with a lower energy content.
This implies that it can be expected that mining and use thereof will have a higher ecological
impact per unit of produced material or energy. Since, ﬁnally, nearly 20% of the resources
used within Europe are imported, it is exporting countries and regions that will to a considerable
extent experience the ecological impacts of European consumption.1
Knowledge economies’ socio-economic dimension
The socio-economic sustainability dimension is not very promising either. A report of the OECD
mentions an increase of poverty and inequality in two-thirds of OECD countries (OECD 2011).
Andrew Simms observes:
During the 1980s, for every $100 added to the value of the global economy, around $2,20 found its
way to those living below the World Bank’s absolute poverty line. During the 1990s, that share shrank
to just 60 cents. This inequity in income distribution – more like a ﬂood up than a trickle down –
means that for the poor to get slightly less poor, the rich have to get very much richer. It would
take around $166 worth of global growth to generate $1 extra for people living on below $1 a day.
(2008, 49)
A systematic replacement of human labour – another form of ‘natural’ capital – with technol-
ogies implies moreover that it becomes for an increasing number of people ever more difﬁcult to
ﬁnd an attractive and inspiring job (Skott and Guy 2007, 124–131). Technological innovation
does not seem to ﬁt easily with the creation of jobs. On the contrary, further automation is
blamed as being a main cause for increasing unemployment. This relationship has been put






























introduction and rapid spreading of computers (Rommetveit et al. 2013, 74–75). Brynjolfsson and
McAfee (2011) argue:
In each case, economic theory is clear. Even when technological progress increases productivity and
overall wealth, it can also affect the division of rewards, potentially making some people worse off
than they were before the innovation. In a growing economy, the gains to the winners may be
larger than the losses of those who are hurt, but this is a small consolation to those who come out
on the short end of the bargain.
Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011) distinguish between three sets of winners and losers: high-
skilled versus low-skilled workers, ‘superstars’ versus everyone else, and capital versus labour.
They argue:
Each set has well-documented facts and compelling links to digital technology. What’s more, these
sets are not mutually exclusive. In fact, the winners in one set are more likely to be winners in the
other two sets as well, which concentrates the consequences.
Science’s role in knowledge economies
In knowledge-based economies, organised knowledge production adds a coordination mechanism
to the social system of societies, in addition to economic exchange relations and political control.
The triple helix of university, industry, and government shape each other’s expectations (Leydes-
dorff 2010). This entanglement of the science and innovation community with industry and gov-
ernment easily runs counter to researchers’ critical distance from dominant beliefs and practices.
Confronted with grand challenges on the one hand and societal controversies on the other,
evidence-based policy-making has not only, over the last decade, become a catch-cry and aspira-
tion of governments. It also emerged as an academic movement which seeks to focus on ‘what
works’ and so try to avoid the pitfalls of policy driven by ideology or values (Courtenay Botterill
and Hindmoor 2012, 367–379). However, this urging for evidence-based policy overlooks that
‘evidence-based policy’ in fact often comes down to ‘policy-based evidence’ (Rommetveit
et al. 2013). ‘Knowledge is produced and projected in accordance with Society’s perceived
needs, and so a direct extension of power’ (Lietaer et al. 2012; Rommetveit et al. 2013). More-
over, implicitly the idea of the universal validity of scientiﬁc knowledge and technological know-
how largely inﬂuences research policy strategies to respond to global challenges: these strategies
are, to a large degree, conceived as if top-down introductions of new technologies are the royal
road to effective solutions.2 Consider, in this perspective, efforts in many countries to deﬁne main
areas of (mainly technological) research.3
At most objective, but not straightforwardly true
Scientiﬁc knowledge and technological know-how are, however, neither normatively nor empiri-
cally obviously founded. Scientiﬁc knowledge is at most objective, but never neutral. Scientiﬁc
insights derive their objectivity from their recognition by peers from within a speciﬁc disciplinary
community. Those peers acknowledge scientiﬁc insights when they recognise – given the disci-
plinary paradigm they are familiar with – the research methods and procedures used to obtain
these insights as valid and when they can imagine that they, given a similar research layout (infra-
structural conditions, selection of empirical data, ﬁnancial or time restrictions,… ), could them-
selves have obtained similar research results. In other words, scientiﬁc objectivity is a
characteristic derived from an intersubjective judgement or an intersubjective decision.4 Scientiﬁc





























insights are, in short, historically contingent conceptual constructs. Therefore, they can never be
straightforwardly ‘true’ or ‘false’; they can at most be ‘accepted’ or ‘unaccepted’ – for the time
being (Kuhn 1962).
This observation does not question the scientiﬁc ambition for objectivity: it is a good idea that
scientists continuously expose their insights to the insights of their colleagues and adapt them in
case they acknowledge the intrinsic value of critical comments. It does, however, imply that no
deﬁnitive and unequivocal empirical foundation for scientiﬁc knowledge exists. Scientiﬁc knowl-
edge – as all knowledge – remains susceptible to discussion, if not from within a particular dis-
ciplinary perspective, then at least from the perspective of other disciplinary paradigms or from
non-scientiﬁc perspectives.5 To conclude, knowledge always remains to a certain extent empiri-
cally underdetermined and, hence, never straightforwardly ‘true’.
A(n) (un)critical factor of production
Science and technology are unavoidably value-laden. Our shared belief in the neutrality and
societal value of science and technology emerged in the societal context of the seventeenth
century, in which religious conﬂicts led to disaster and untamed culture and politics seemed
easily to develop into dissent and violence (Rommetveit et al. 2013). In this context, scientiﬁc
clarity appeared to be attractive. It is in this context that modern economics came into existence
and that Bacon – philosopher, statesman, and scientist – promoted scientiﬁc advancement as a
precondition for wealth and happiness.
Useful knowledge is, in Bacon’s view, knowledge regarding causal relationships, because this
type of knowledge provides us with power, that is, with opportunities to limit hazard and achieve
positive effects. His conviction is, however, simplistic in at least two respects.
For whom the costs and for whom the beneﬁts?
First, research policy strategies within knowledge economies more often than not assume, as
Bacon did, that the subjects of scientiﬁc power can be considered a uniform and consensual
‘we’, that is, that everybody experiences and evaluates possible costs and beneﬁts of scientiﬁc
powers in the same way.
Consider – let us mention a rather extreme example – weapons of mass destruction. These are
clearly meant to gain more power over one’s ‘enemies’ and our ‘enemies’ are then those who we
perceive as a threat for our future wealth and happiness. Much less extreme examples, but a day-
to-day reality, are new and emerging technologies. These are, in the context of Western knowl-
edge economies and from a political perspective, above all a means to maintain or strengthen
– unavoidably at the cost of other regions or nations – one’s competitive position in a globalised
economy. Considered from an economic perspective, they are meant to claim a bigger part of the
‘pie’.
The sustained controversy regarding genetically modiﬁed organisms provides a clear illus-
tration. The gist of this controversy regards the belief that the model of industrial agriculture
and, hence, also the business model of the biotechnological industry, is the only feasible road
to feed world population. In this model – that undermines a prevailing practice of farmers to
store, re-use, share, and improve their seeds and that threatens biodiversity because of a drastic
reduction of the variety of agricultural crops – biotechnological knowledge, embedded into enti-
ties that transform into marketable products thanks to speciﬁc intellectual property regimes
(IPRs), is a source of ﬁnancial gains for a few enterprises and a source of ﬁnancial loss for a
lot of farmers. Prevailing research and innovation practices leave this crucial question – for






























can destroy a research career: consider, for example, the vicissitudes of a Flemish researcher who
acted (in 2011), during her private time, as a spokesperson for activists drawing attention to this
question. She was consequently sacked by the University she was working for (http://
threerottenpotatoes.wordpress.com/reinstate-her-now/)!
Systemic complexity
Bacon does not take causal complexity into consideration either. He only takes situations where
one cause leads to one consequence as an example. This ideal type of scientiﬁc knowledge and
technological know-how found translation in the academic organisation of scientiﬁc research via
(a) an increasing specialisation and fragmentation of knowledge domains and, hence, an ongoing
division into different (sub)disciplines and (b) experiments performed in laboratory contexts of
which the boundary conditions are controllable and the results are quantiﬁable as exemplary
for testing scientiﬁc validity.
Actual sustainability challenges are, however, complex. This implies that they can be con-
sidered ‘wicked problems’, which have, amongst others, the following characteristics (Vanden-
broeck 2012):
(1) their framing is not unequivocal;
(2) a set of potential solutions exist;
(3) solutions are not simply true or false, but better or worse.
In complex situations, our knowledge is at most partial: we know some, but far from all causes
and even less the possible interactions between various causes and initiatives, various actions and
reactions. In such situations, ill thought-out application of scientiﬁc knowledge and technological
know-how poses a risk: it can always lead to unexpected, irreversible, and undesirable conse-
quences (which, often implicitly from a disciplinary perspective and explicitly from an economic
perspective, are easily considered ‘externalities’ (McMurtry 2010)). Even stronger, many
environmental problems are to be understood as manifestations of technological interventions
in the world (EEA 2010, 2013). Most researchers, however, do not get to the question whether
their scientiﬁc or technological intervention does effectively more good than harm (and who
receives either the good or the harmful part). This is obviously related to the fact that current regu-
lation and governance of knowledge and technology basically overlook and are not really both-
ered by the possibility (a) that the beneﬁt–cost ratio may be smaller than 1 or (b) the distribution of
beneﬁts and costs is unfair (McMurtry 2010; Rommetveit et al. 2013). The emergence, since the
latter part of the twentieth century, of a lively STS (Social Studies of Science) community and
efforts to promote and perform ‘post-normal science’ (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1991, 137–152),
risk and uncertainty research, technology assessment, foresight studies and transdisciplinary
research did not change the fact that only a minority within the research community are in a pos-
ition to act as if they acknowledge the non-neutrality and risks of scientiﬁc and technological bias
and hubris7 (Brandt et al. 2013, 1–15; Cornell et al. 2013, 60–70; Diedrich et al. 2011, 935–939;
Jahn, Bergmann, and Keil 2012, 1–10).
Responsible research and innovation
Normative anchor points
‘Sustainable development’ pops up as a guiding principle in the mission statement of many public
and private research organisations. Though the concept has been extensively discussed in global
sustainability research (Clark and Dickson 2003, 8059–8061; Dedeurwaerdere 2014; Dietz and





























Neumayer 2007, 617–626; Griggs et al. 2013, 305–307), in most cases the normative content
framing this concept is hardly made explicit in Western research-performing organisations,
neither to their employees nor to their stakeholders.
We argue in this section for strong sustainability as a normative anchor point for the ecological
dimension of sustainable development, equality for its social dimension, and a-growth for its
economic dimension.8
Strong sustainability as a normative anchor point for the ecological dimension
With respect to the ecological dimension of the research and innovation community’s responsi-
bility, the distinction between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ sustainability is important. The ‘weak’
version is based on the vision that economic growth can be decoupled from an increasing use
of natural capital (Dedeurwaerdere 2013). Corresponding indicators are based on the normative
question of how many natural resources we can use now and how many we should invest in
manmade technological capital in order to be capable to increase consumption later on – when
non-renewable natural resources will be exhausted (Dietz and Neumayer 2007, 617–626). It pre-
supposes that the degree of substitutability between renewable and non-renewable resources and
between manmade and natural capital will always sufﬁce to realise required utility. It hardly
recognises absolute limits of stocks of natural resources.
The ‘strong’ version of sustainable development takes absolute limits of the earthly natural
capital as a starting point (Dedeurwaerdere 2013). It assumes that possibilities to substitute are
limited and that transgression of some absolute limits of natural capital poses a threat to the sus-
tainability of societies. It does, in other words, acknowledge that tipping points exist, transcen-
dence of which can cause irreversible damage (Barnosky et al. 2012, 52–58). These critical
limits or tipping points are, admittedly, difﬁcult to deﬁne. Therefore, various authors plead to pre-
serve the functionalities of living systems in time by preserving their resilience and to keep every
kind of capital (natural, cultural, institutional, social, and infrastructural/technological) intact.
This does not imply a static but a dynamic vision on the speciﬁcities of the diverse kinds of
capital.
Based on the complexity of sustainability challenges and the limited capacities of actual
research and innovation systems to deﬁne tipping points and feasible and desirable ways to
prevent societies to transcend them – climate change is an illustrative example – we argue that
the ‘strong’ version of sustainable development should be the normative anchor point for the eco-
logical dimension of RRI. This implies that the (theoretical) economic ambition of ‘maximising
utility of natural capital’ should be replaced by a (practical) societal ambition of ‘preserving resi-
lience of life support systems’.
Equality as a normative anchor point for the social dimension
We cannot but observe that, despite the continuous ﬂow of scientiﬁcally and technologically
induced substitutions, the ecological footprint of industrialised and industrialising countries has
but increased. Absolute decoupling between these economies and their use of natural capital is
not realised. This has not only to do with the Jevons paradox,9 but also with a direct relationship
between environmental performance and global and national inequality (Dedeurwaerdere 2013).
Inequality – in both income and power – does not only result in unequal access to ecosystem ser-
vices, but also in unequal distribution of the costs of environmental degradation. As a conse-
quence, inequality inﬂuences total use of natural capital. In the absence of social equality, a
social driver is lacking to keep natural capital on a sustainable level (or to enable ecosystems






























fair and reasonable part of ecosystem services can one expect citizens to take responsibility for
ecosystems’ maintenance and improvement (Dedeurwaerdere 2013; Shiva 2011, 23–27).
Lack of responsibility for life-supporting ecosystems should not one-sidedly be deemed a
characteristic of the poorer part of the population (for whom options for choice are rather
restricted). A study reviewing some historical examples of societal collapses concludes that in
unequal societies
the Elites – due to their wealth – do not suffer the detrimental effects of the environmental collapse
until much later than the Commoners. This buffer of wealth allows Elites to continue ‘business as
usual’ despite the impending catastrophe. It is likely that this is an important mechanism that
would help explain how historical collapses were allowed to occur by elites who appear to be obliv-
ious to the catastrophic trajectory [… ]. This buffer effect is further reinforced by the long, apparently
sustainable trajectory prior to the beginning of the collapse. While some members of society might
raise the alarm that the system is moving towards an impending collapse and therefore advocate struc-
tural changes to society in order to avoid it, Elites and their supporters, who opposed making these
changes, could point to the long sustainable trajectory ‘so far’ in support of doing nothing. (Moteshar-
rei, Rivas, and Kalnay 2014, 90–102)
A-growth as a normative anchor point for the economic dimension
‘Strong’ sustainability and equality require an ‘a-growth’ scenario. ‘A-growth’ is a concept
introduced by Serge Latouche as an alternative for the religious belief in economic growth
(Perez-Carmona 2013, 83–161). Latouche argues: ‘we should be talking at the theoretical level
of “a-growth”, in the sense in which we speak of “a-theism”, rather than “de-growth’” (2008, 8).
Robert Ayres already remarked years ago:
None of the important economic actors, whether government leaders or private sector executives, has
an incentive compatible with a ‘no-growth’ policy. No economic growth is evidently not a politically
viable proposition for a democracy, at least in a world with enormous gaps between poverty and
wealth. But ‘no growth’ is an imperative as regards extractive materials, energy and pollution emis-
sions because economic activity is based on a material function. (Ayres 2008, 281–310)
And Alexander Perez-Carmona concludes laconically:
And yet, unviable proposals do not transform theory and evidence into a myth. [… ] In choosing
between tackling a political ‘impossibility’ and a biophysical impossibility, reason tells us to judge
the latter to be more impossible and to take our chances with the former. (2013, 83–161)
Is the combination of economic growth and ‘strong’ sustainability really impossible? Until
now, economic growth, as it is nowadays understood and institutionalised, did in any case not
show the opposite.10 Both Bernard Lietaer et al. and John McMurtry explain the inner logic
that prevents industrial knowledge economies to consider a-growth as a normative anchor
point for the economic dimension of sustainable development (Lietaer et al. 2012; McMurtry
2010). Both point to the present ﬁnancial system as the ultimate seat of system rule.
The core of the ﬁnancial-rule mechanism is that over 95% of money and credit is issued by private
ﬁnancial institutions through individual and public debt contracts which are backed by 0–7%
fractional currency reserves whose ﬁnal guarantor is government and the public purse itself.
(McMurtry 2010)
A ﬁnancial system based on debt forces enterprises to ‘grow’ in order to pay off their debts. Tech-
nological innovation is a dominant strategy to grow, supported by public authorities.





























Technological innovation allows entrepreneurs, indeed, to increase ‘productivity’ – that is, to
make more or more expensive marketable products – and to reduce ‘costs’, for instance via repla-
cement of ‘expensive’ human labour and via externalisation of environmental and social costs.
This creates a vicious cycle. Public authorities invite big, small, and medium enterprises con-
tinuously to innovate technologically, hoping that this will help to increase the economic ‘pie’,
employment, and state revenue. Enterprises, in their turn, continuously call upon public auth-
orities to commit larger budgets for (mainly natural-scientiﬁc and technological) research. For
this, enterprises receive the support of both public and private research organisations as
‘science itself is subjugated by the macro ﬁnancial mechanism’ (McMurtry 2010).
A systematic replacement of natural capital by technology is – as Herman Daly has been
arguing for a long time – ecologically inefﬁcient: the more technology one introduces as a repla-
cement of natural capital (the substitution concept), the more natural capital one needs to realise
this substitution (Perez-Carmona 2013, 122). Hence, the conclusion of ‘trade-off between econ-
omic progress and environmental sustainability is a myth’.
To conclude, enterprises, public authorities, and research-performing organisations keep each
other in a catch 22, based on the justiﬁcation that scientiﬁc and technological innovation and con-
siderable public funding of new and emerging science and technology are necessary to maintain
economic growth and national welfare (Rommetveit et al. 2013). At the end, industry, govern-
ment, the science community, and the wider public ﬁnd themselves in the same ﬁnancial straight-
jacket, which does not take account of the state of our common (ecological and social) life-
supporting means.
The meaning and feasibility of the research and innovation community’s ‘responsibility’
Is it feasible for research and innovation communities within knowledge economies to act respon-
sibly, if sustainable development is its guiding principle? A ﬁrst part of the answer to this is that it
should, even though it will not be easy. Nowadays and contrary to pre-modern times, scientiﬁc
and technological powers are such that the natural conditions of human existence – both the
nature of human beings and of their environment – are continuously altered, either gradually
or suddenly. It is because researchers and innovators – together with wider society – are
capable of gradual and radical changes, both in the short and in the very long run and both
locally and globally, that they are – I follow Hans Jonas here – responsible. According to
Jonas, acting on the base of scientiﬁc insights and technological know-how is acting in an ethi-
cally sensitive way. And since the effects of the collective actions of researchers and innovators do
not remain restricted to here and now but extend widely in time and space, their responsibility
means responsibility for the future (Jonas 1984, translation by H. Jonas, with the help of
D. Herr of Das Prinzip Verantwortung (1979)).
The sense of this future-oriented responsibility is, to safeguard the humanity of the conditions
of existence for both present and future generations, which is translated in this article into the three
normative anchor points of strong sustainability, equality, a-growth. Repairing, maintaining, or
improving humane conditions of existence should be the standard against which to evaluate per-
formance of research and innovation activities.11 RRI is, next to a future-oriented responsibility,
also a goal-oriented responsibility. It comprises, hence, a consequentialist interpretation of
responsibility, though this consequentialism does not depend so much on the predictive capacities
of science,12 but rather on the monitoring capacities of research. The second part of the answer to
the feasibility question has to elaborate on how research and innovation systems can fulﬁl their
combined future and goal-oriented responsibility. An adequate answer to this question presup-
poses acknowledgement of the limited descriptive, prescriptive, and predictive capacities of






























The nature and role of ‘RRI’
Locally situated
The combined future- and goal-oriented responsibility for sustainable development is a total
responsibility. It does not only regard material needs, but everything that enables human
beings to develop in a humane way (such as knowledge, social and moral skills, practical and cul-
tural skills, societal structures and institutions, etc.). It is of a political rather than an economic
kind. This means, ﬁrst, that it asks whether speciﬁc research actions or innovation initiatives
are good for the world (Grinbaum and Groves 2013, 119–142): it thus transcends by far (econ-
omically inspired) questions a) regarding the balance of costs and beneﬁts that results from
actions and initiatives and b) regarding individuals’ liability for possibly harmful effects of
the uncontrollable chain of actions and reactions emerging from his or her initial action or initiat-
ive. It is, second, a collective responsibility (Mitcham and von Schomberg 2000, 167–189): a
responsibility shared by the various stakeholders confronted with a particular sustainability
challenge.
Given the limitations of scientiﬁc knowledge to describe and explain the complexity of sus-
tainability challenges in their totality, research and innovation can only be performed responsibly
on the condition that its scope is reduced to a sufﬁciently concrete level (Kläy, Zimmermann, and
Schneider 2014). Reduction of its scope is needed in order to clarify (a) the diversity of interpret-
ations that the various stakeholders who are confronted with the challenge hold, (b) the combi-
nation of global and local causes and reasons for the challenge to come into existence and to
persist, and (c) the diversity of projected futures that the various stakeholders consider a feasible,
humane, and sustainable solution.
This implies that research and innovation should not any longer primarily focus on the devel-
opment of new and emergent science and technology and on the vicissitudes of their societal
introductions. The prevailing strategy should not be ‘green’ technology push: the guiding ques-
tion should not be how to introduce new scientiﬁc and technological knowledge and know-how
into society so that products and production processes become (ecologically and/or economically)
more efﬁcient. This strategy draws on the false promise of technological mastery that comes with
scientiﬁc knowledge.13 This misleading strategy induces the research community, consequently,
to perform both anticipatory and retrospective, either or not integrated impact assessments (both
on the technology and the policy level), which – I agree here with Grinbaum and Groves – is
doomed to fail, because
creative action and innovation point forward, opening up the world the past has created and adding
new entities to it that change the way it works. The world that scientiﬁc understanding extrapolates
into the future – with its gaze still directed toward yesterday – might tomorrow no longer exist. Inno-
vation therefore creates a problem of knowledge.14 (Grinbaum and Groves 2013, 119–142)
Research should rather focus on a speciﬁc – that is, locally concrete – manifestation of a
global sustainability challenge. This is a societal demand-driven strategy. The guiding question
becomes then: how can we realise – based on which combination of new and old disciplinary
and practical knowledge and know-how – a locally feasible and globally justiﬁable humane
and sustainable response to a context-speciﬁc sustainability challenge.
To conclude, sustainability research and innovation should be glocal in order to deal with the
descriptive and prescriptive limitations of scientiﬁc knowledge and in order to re-empower both
citizens and scientists (Swyngedouw 2004, 25–48). This would allow formal knowledge actors to
act as much as a citizen than as a professional. Glocally oriented knowledge implies a reduction of
the causal and normative complexity of sustainability challenges: it delimits the scope of research
and innovation to a feasible, concrete level.






























In our globalised world, concrete manifestations of sustainability challenges have both global and
local, historical and natural dimensions. That is why Hans Jonas pleads for continuous responsi-
bility. Continuous responsibility is a responsibility which relates the past with the present and the
future. It recognises what has been handed down from the past into the present and asks itself how
to integrate this in the future of the people who will live in the future. It regards the tradition of a
collective humane identity (Jonas 1984, translation by H. Jonas, with the help of D. Herr of Das
Prinzip Verantwortung (1979)).
The notion of continuous responsibility suggests that responses to sustainability challenges
should build on systemic insights into causes and reasons of their coming into existence (and,
possibly, of their persistence). Insight in causes and reasons helps to formulate meaningful
actions and initiatives to realise desirable solutions. Involvement of various stakeholders is
crucial to co-construct systemic insights from a variety of perspectives and, consequently, for
enlarging the scope of envisioned futures.
Local sustainability challenges cannot one-sidedly be solved from a particular disciplinary
perspective, for two reasons. First, a disciplinary perspective always considers reality from a
speciﬁc theoretical frame or paradigm and, consequently, challenges ﬁrst have to be translated
into disciplinary terms in order to make them ﬁt for a scientiﬁc ‘solution’. This translation is
more often than not incompatible with stakeholders’ understanding of the challenge. Second,
increasing disciplinary specialisation and fragmentation easily leads to real-life challenges
either being translated in a reductionist way or being neglected because the disciplinary perspec-
tive prevents professional knowledge actors to perceive it.
These disciplinary limitations do not imply that disciplinary perspectives are not useful or
needed. Problem deﬁnitions of local sustainability challenges indeed always consist of a set of
ideas regarding (a) causes and reasons for the unsustainability of phenomena and (b) possibly
useful theoretical and practical ways to deal with them. Both causes and reasons can be either
global or local or a combination thereof. Scientiﬁc knowledge actors are competent to deal
with rather global causes and reasons and their consequences and with rather theoretical ways
– these are ways that are deemed to have a rather global/universal validity – to intervene. In
order to deal with the totality of causes and reasons, the research and innovation community
should at least pay due attention to both natural sciences and social sciences and humanities as
possible sources of inspiration for effective research and innovation activities.
Due attention should also be paid to grass roots initiatives. As niche initiatives, they often take
little notice of some dominant institutions, structures, or cultures and they can bring in new
visions, knowledge, and know-how that comply with local capacities and ambitions. In order
to get the systemic analysis of the coming into existence/persistence of a local manifestation of
a global sustainability challenge sufﬁciently adequate, why not support citizens who experience
these local manifestations and who are already struggling to deal with them in ways (a) they deem
consistent with their values and (b) which build further on their proper capacities and resources?
In short, this is a plea (a) to attenuate the scientiﬁc ambition to present rather universal expla-
nations and, consequently, prescribe rather de-contextualised innovations, but to click down
research activities and innovation recommendations to rather local situations and (b) to behave
as knowledge partners – who take a constructively critical but respectful stance towards citizens’
practical knowledge claims and normative ambitions – instead of knowledge teachers.
Exchanges between local problem-solving initiatives and rather globally oriented professional
knowledge and know-how can, moreover, improve the resilience of the research and innovation
system: because it enlarges the variety of possible responses to sustainability challenges and






























To conclude, glocal sustainability research (GSR) and innovation should be of a transdisci-
plinary kind. Transdisciplinarity helps the research and innovation community to deal with the
prescriptive limitations of scientiﬁc knowledge and technological know-how. A transdisciplinary
approach, again, allows the research and innovation community to fulﬁl its public (as a collective
of citizens) rather than its professional (role) responsibilities (Mitcham and von Schomberg 2000,
167–189).
Action research
It is not only the descriptive and prescriptive capacities of knowledge that are restricted. We
cannot be conﬁdent that actions and initiatives based on systemic knowledge insights will be suf-
ﬁciently effective. The future always escapes the effectiveness of actions taken at a speciﬁc place
and time (see Hans Jonas and Hannah Arendt). The results of actions are unpredictable and are out
of actors’ control, once they enter into a socio-technical web of further actions and reactions.
These predictive restrictions do, however, not imply an evasion from our total and continuous
responsibility. It implies, in the words of Harremoës, ‘the need, as a matter of cultural change, for
society’s institutions to enlarge existing notions of ethical responsibility to encompass these
unknowns, which are predictable in principle even though not in speciﬁcs’ (Harremoës et al.
2002). Institutionalisation of a precautionary attitude is a way to ‘encompass these unknowns’.
What could a suitable precautionary attitude with respect to our ambition for sustainable devel-
opment consist of?
Rather than assigning considerable budgets to the performance of complex (ex ante or ex post)
policy or technology assessments (that rely on knowledge’s limited predictive capacities), why
not make monitoring activities an integral part of glocal transdisciplinary research and innovation
activities? Why not understand precaution as a procedure – rather than a principle – of (a) gather-
ing empirical evidence and comparing this evidence with the ecological, social, and economic
performance indicators that are included in projected visions of potential solutions to a glocal sus-
tainability challenge and (b) adjusting research and innovation activities as long as a gap remains
between empirical ﬁndings and projected sustainability targets?
A procedural approach to precaution differs widely from what Grinbaum and Groves describe
as ‘little more than a negative version of foresight-based consequentialism’ which grounds
decisions on worst-case scenarios ‘which [indeed] still requires that we foresee what these
might be, and that we make a judgement whether the beneﬁts of acting are “proportionally”
better than the potential hazards of doing so’ (Grinbaum and Groves 2013, 119–142). The
latter interpretation of the precautionary principle testiﬁes to an economic interpretation of
responsibility: it presupposes, next to ﬁctive predictive capacities, that a neutral, impartial way
exists of measuring out beneﬁts and hazards against each other. The interpretation of a precaution-
ary attitude as suggested here is, on the contrary, of a political kind: it considers whether the col-
lective actions of both professional and non-professional knowledge actors contribute positively
to the – locally speciﬁc – world these actors hope to live in and to hand over to their
descendants.15
In short, GSR should take the form of action research in order to overcome knowledge’s
limited predictive capacities.
Knowledge arenas as breeding grounds for RRI
In present research and innovation systems, the deﬁnition of research and innovation agenda’s and
– projects is mainly the preserve of (academic, strategic, or industrial) research-performing organ-
isations. The selection of research and innovation projects that effectively get funded, in its turn,





























mainly depends on the funding policies of public (regional, national, or international) funding
organisations or on the funding strategies of universities, university colleges, and (large)
enterprises.
The larger part of research projects that research-performing organisations propose are
designed from a disciplinary perspective; they start from a rather reductionist interpretation of
real-life challenges, and they aim at theoretical models and technological instruments and pro-
cesses that are validated in speciﬁc laboratory contexts of which the boundary conditions are
(made) susceptible to control. This rather limited variety of research projects consequently
enters a ﬁnancial/economic funnel: this implies that research proposals are predominantly ﬁltered
(1) according to the extent their results are deemed ﬁt for monetary valorisation and (2) depending
on the nature and extent of their technological – rather than sociocultural or systemic – ingenuity.
In order for RRI to counterbalance these prevailing research designing and funding strategies,
research and innovation systems are in need of some adjustments. One adjustment could consist
of institutionalising knowledge arenas that complement or, even better, transform present-day
science–industry interfaces (Cornell et al. 2013, 60–70). The mandate of these knowledge
arenas would be to stimulate the design, performance, and monitoring of GSR and to act as an
observatory or clearing house for RRI activities.
In the next paragraphs, a process architecture – in need of further testing in regional/national
contexts – is proposed and some preconditions for making knowledge arenas operational are
described.
A process architecture for GSR
In previous sections, the concept of ‘responsible research and innovation’ is translated into the
concept of ‘glocal sustainability research’, which takes the form of locally situated, transdiciplin-
ary action research and which takes strong sustainability, equality, and a-growth as its respective
ecological, social, and economic normative anchor points. This translation implies that
(1) the focus shifts from the ‘novelty’ of scientiﬁc and technological research activities to the
factual and normative situational characteristics of local sustainability challenges;
(2) the ﬁlter shifts from the exact sciences as the dominant source of scientiﬁc knowledge and
technological know-how, to the social sciences, the humanities, and the natural and
engineering sciences as potential sources of knowledge and know-how;
(3) responsibility expands to both formal and informal knowledge actors as providers of both
theoretical and practical insights and both global and local normative ambitions.
This translation of the concept of ‘responsible research and innovation’ complies with what
Rommetveit et al. call ‘deep innovation’: it investigates the effectiveness of its activities with
respect to the initial sustainability challenge; it takes the interactions between diverse dimensions
of the sustainability challenge into consideration, and it constructively builds on the active invol-
vement of various stakeholders.
From this translation, we can derive the various phases of the process architecture of RRI. The
consecutive tasks are:
(1) investigating what the speciﬁcity of the local challenge precisely consists of according to
the various stakeholders experiencing it and co-creating – together with these stake-
holders – a common problem deﬁnition,































(3) co-envisioning, based on a considerations of the detected causes and reasons, a humane
and sustainable future which is consistent with the locally speciﬁc factual and normative
preconditions,
(4) considering which types of scientiﬁc and practical knowledge and know-how are needed
to realise this envisioned future,
(5) co-designing and performing an experiment (i.e. action research), with the locally speciﬁc
world as a real-life laboratory,
(6) monitoring – with the envisioned future as standard – the results of this experiment and
adjust either the experiment, the envisioned future, or both when needed.
The mandate of knowledge arenas
Speciﬁc knowledge arenas – that is, units that consist of some staff members – are needed to
manage GSR projects. The mandate of these knowledge arenas is
(1) to start up dialogues between persons, groups, organisations that engage themselves for
speciﬁc glocal sustainability challenges,
(2) to support the co-deﬁnition of action-research projects that aim at solving the sustainabil-
ity challenge,
(3) to support the composition of transdiciplinary project teams that are ﬁt for the perform-
ance and monitoring of the co-deﬁned research activities,
(4) to make ongoing research activities and results publicly accessible so that interested
persons can question and comment on them,
(5) to document and archive project activities and results in order to make them accessible for
further RRI activities.
Institutional preconditions for a knowledge arena
A suitable location within regional/national research and innovation systems. Knowledge arenas
can be institutionalised in different ways within regional or national contexts. They could either
be implemented within research-performing organisations, within research funding organisations,
or they could be conceived as an independent organisation. Anyhow, they should act on the junc-
tion between the science community, policy, industry, and civil society.
In order to allow them to act as impartial and independent as feasible, it would perhaps – this
certainly is a topic for further research – be best to institutionalise them so that they can act as a
broker between various research organisations, rather than being institutionalised in each
research-performing organisation separately. For, in case their communication strategy is
implemented in an open and transparent way, this would allow that different perspectives,
insights, visions, and interests are brought to the fore and enter into a constructive dialogue. It
would, consequently, challenge research organisations to found and motivate their respective per-
spectives, insights, visions, and interests publicly and, hence, to transcend them to build shared
visions, insights, and interests and to democratise processes of knowledge production and
application.16
This plea for independent knowledge arenas does, however, not contradict that knowledge
arenas that are institutionalised within research organisations can be important to test their
room for manoeuvre, the boundary conditions that should be fulﬁlled to guarantee their appropri-
ate autonomy and impartiality, and to test their relative advantages and disadvantages compared to
knowledge arenas that are institutionalised in between different organisations and societal
spheres.





























Knowledge as a public good. Knowledge is a ‘joint impact’ or ‘non-rival’ good. It is a cluster of
insights, of which use of a smaller or larger part of it does not imply its consumption: the cluster of
insights does not diminish by using parts of it and it is even likely that use of parts of it will
increase the whole of insights in case use of some insights results in the creation of new insights.
That knowledge is a ‘joint impact’ good relates to the characteristics of knowledge itself. Use of
knowledge by some does in principle not jeopardise use of the same knowledge by others. Knowl-
edge is at the same time a ‘non-exclusive’ good: one cannot simply prevent persons or organis-
ations that dispose of certain knowledge from using it. Knowledge only becomes less or more
exclusive via the institutionalisation of IPRs. IPRs deﬁne who and under which conditions
have rights to access, use, and manage speciﬁc knowledge, to market it, and to exclude others
from these rights (Hess and Ostrom 2001; Maskus and Reichman 2004, 279–320). It is, in
other words, IPRs that deﬁne whether knowledge is rather a public or a private good (and the dis-
tinction between both is less strict than is usually thought). More important than this distinction
are the concrete clauses of which IPRs are composed. These clauses deﬁne the rights and duties of
the owners of IPRs and the concomitant rights and duties of those who do not own them
(Deblonde 2001).
Here are some tasks for public authorities. They should ensure that the resources needed to
develop knowledge and know-how to deal effectively with sustainability challenges are provided
– in case the research and innovation challenges do not ﬁt with the perceived private interests of
individual persons or organisations or in case private persons or organisations do not dispose of
the necessary resources to perform the necessary research and innovation activities – and that the
beneﬁts arising from research and innovation activities are redistributed in a fair and reasonable
way to the funding community (Maskus and Reichman 2004, 279–320). One aspect of both these
tasks is the reconsideration of prevailing IPRs.
According to Maskus and Reichman, internationally prevailing IPRs – as stipulated in the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS-Agreement) –
are mainly beneﬁcial for those – ‘a de facto “knowledge cartel”’ – who invest in monetary
terms in the appropriation of IPRs, not those who contribute most to the production of new knowl-
edge and know-how or make most use of it. In this ‘knowledge cartel’, SMEs and public research
organisations are, amongst others, strikingly underrepresented. This way, present TRIPS-Agree-
ment risks, paradoxically, preventing further liberalisation of global markets.17 The availability
within the public domain of original data and scientiﬁc information decreases at a moment in
time that the possibilities to connect local and distributed knowledge- and databases via ICT
are more extended than ever. Not only privately but also publicly ﬁnanced results become less
accessible. Also public research organisations are more and more aiming at monetary valorisation
of their research results, so that some opportunities for research and innovation activities get lost
and their costs increase.18
Moreover, current TRIPS-Agreement is not favourable to the provision of public goods such
as health, education, scientiﬁc research, agriculture, and environment. They diminish the power of
public authorities to realise public goods via adjustments of national legislation: nations are
allowed to
[formulate and amend] their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public health
and nutrition, and [… ] promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-econ-
omic and technological development [… if] consistent with the provisions of this [TRIPS] Agree-
ment. (Robert Howse quoted in Maskus and Reichman 2004, 279–320)
International IPR standards are in need of revision in order to realise a proper balance between






























regarding the negative effects of prevailing IPR policies (Maskus and Reichman 2004, 279–320).
On the one hand, barriers to invest in the production and distribution of knowledge should be
lowered to a reasonable level and appropriate IPRs should be deﬁned to compensate for these
investments in a fair and reasonable way. On the other hand, IPRs should create opportunities
via digital communication technologies to connect producers and users of scientiﬁc knowledge
and technological know-how in a global knowledge pool.
Juridical and economic insights in a publicly appropriate international system of IPRs still are
in full development (Maskus and Reichman 2004, 279–320). The European Commission already
invites public research organisations to reformulate their knowledge exchange strategies and it
promises to stimulate further research in IPRs.19 It, however, remains to be clariﬁed how (and
to what extent) these initiatives are linked to ‘strong’ sustainability ambitions.
Appropriate remuneration strategies. Next to the problem of deﬁning publicly appropriate IPRs in
order to reduce the costs of sustainability research and innovation, also the question regarding equi-
table, fair, and reasonable remuneration strategies to compensate those – both professional and non-
professional, theoretical and practical experts –who contribute to sustainability research and inno-
vation activities remains to be answered. Unless I overlook some research domains and topics, a
brief literature search suggests that this question remains nearly untouched within the scientiﬁc
community. I propose this as a new research topic to be opened in the ‘endless frontier’ of science.20
A suitable business model for knowledge arenas. Finally, in order to guarantee the continuity of
knowledge arenas, funding should be provided in order to compensate for its operational costs.
Here again, further research is needed in order to deﬁne a suitable business model. Potential
funding organisations can be public and private research organisations, and also research units
within civil society organisations and public administrations.
For universities and university colleges, investing in a knowledge arena could be an attractive
way to provide societal services (which is the third role of universities and university colleges, next
to performing research and providing education). For companies, it could be an attractive way to
take up their corporate social responsibility. Moreover, both public and private research organis-
ations can be compensated for their investments in knowledge arenas. They can be a productive
source of inspiration for developing research proposals and consortia, because they allow one to
get a better feeling with the (sustainability) insights and expectations of various societal and scien-
tiﬁc actors. They can also help researchers to extend and consolidate their stakeholder network and
to valorise their research results more efﬁciently. Co-design, performance and monitoring possibly
– this should be tested in real-life experiments –will result inmore efﬁcient use of research time and
resources. Researchers participating in co-design, performance, andmonitoring will probably have
to spend less timewith bridging the so-called valley of death or with convincing stakeholders of the
usefulness of research results, because together with the design and performance of transdiciplinary
research projects, researchers also create stakeholder support for their results.
For other stakeholders – policy-makers, civil society organisations, citizens’ groups – it is less
clear whether, when, and in which way it is attractive to invest in knowledge arenas and how they
can be rewarded for their investments. As with crowdfunding strategies, this should probably be
considered case-by-case and, here again, this is a research domain that is rather recently opened
for exploration.
Conclusion
Based on an analysis of the sustainability performance of knowledge economies and of the nature
and role of research and innovation in such economies, this article suggests ‘glocal sustainability





























research’ as an ethically feasible translation of the concept of ‘Responsible Research and inno-
vation’. GSR urges the research and innovation community to take a different focus – local sus-
tainability challenges rather than new and emergent science and technology – different glasses – a
combination of natural and social sciences and of humanities rather than a predominance of
natural and engineering sciences – and to include a wider variety of practitioners – both theoreti-
cal and practical experts within the science community, policy, and civil society rather than a
restriction to members of public and private research organisations. In order to stimulate RRI,
knowledge arenas are proposed as breeding grounds.
Several questions remain in order to institutionalise the proposed translation of RRI. One type
of questions regards, for instance, the deﬁnition of fair and reasonable IPRs and of fair and reason-
able remuneration strategies for those who contribute to GSR and innovation. Another topic
regards the quest for appropriate business models to make knowledge arenas operational.
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2. The European Commission in its research framework programme Horizon 2020 set aside a budget of
623 million euros for research in the human and social sciences. This amount represents 1.8% of the
total budget for research, with a success rate of the submitted proposals of 3.6%! Paul Gillespie, author
of The hard business of funding soft science, remarks ‘compared to 46 per cent for nanotechnology, so
the priorities are clear’ (http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/the-hard-business-of-funding-soft-
science-1.1389261; consulted 30/09/2013).
3. These clusters are in Flanders Logistech (on logistics, transport, supply chain management), I-health-
tech (ICT and healthcare), Meditech (healthcare, nutrition, prevention, and treatment), Nanotech,
Sociotech (i.e. ICT for socio-economic innovation), and Ecotech (see http://www.vrwi.be/pdf/
clusterbrochure-en.pdf, consulted 10/12/2014).
4. Otto Neurath, member of the Wiener Kreis of logical positivists, clearly argues – in ‘The Lost Wan-
derers of Descartes and the Auxiliary Motive’ (1913) – why theoretical thinking is a kind of action.
And he mentions as a characteristic of action, whether practical or theoretical, that it is unavoidably
based on a decision since the agent always lacks complete insight (Cohen and Neurath 1983).
5. BrianWynne, director of the British Centre for the Study of Environmental Change (University of Lan-
caster), shows in his well-known article ‘May the Sheep Safely Graze?’ how scientiﬁc insights cause
economic damage to farmers in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident (1986) and how scientists
ignore lay expertise and interpret it as being ‘irrational’ and ‘ignorant’ (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Brian_Wynne).
6. According to McMurtry, the meta program of what is nowadays assumed to be economic – in particu-
lar – and scientiﬁc – in general – rationality consists of (a) self-maximising strategies – instead of
life-maximising strategies of choice – in (b) conditions of scarcity or conﬂict over – instead of in
the historical dynamic of social organisation which continually transforms towards adequate provision
or non-scarcity when not blocked against doing so by ruling privilege – (c) desired payoffs – instead of
life-capacitating vocation – at (d) minimum costs for the self – instead of life-value efﬁciency – to (e)
succeed or win – instead of a mutual quest to prevail over limits to human life capacities (McMurtry
2010).
7. The concepts ‘hubris’ and ‘bias’ are not used here as psychological or moral categories, but as charac-
teristic of actual science and innovation systems.
8. These normative anchor points do not necessarily ﬁt easily with two of the ﬁve normative anchor
points derived from the Treaty on the European Union, as presented by René von Schomberg:































9. The Jevons paradox describes the effect that a technological innovation which increases efﬁciency, and
hence causes that one need less of a certain resource to realise a similar effect (e.g. less fuel needed per
km travelled by car), has a global result of an increased use of this resource (e.g. because people travel
more km by car).
10. The global ecological creditor and debtor map (2007) of the Footprint Network, which compares the
Ecological Footprint of consumption within each country’s boundaries with globally available bioca-
pacity, is illustrative in this respect (http://www.footprintnetwork.org/images/uploads/Ecological_
Footprint_Atlas_2010.pdf, consulted 5/1/2015).
11. This is one of the three meanings Rommetveit and co-authors assign to the concept of ‘deep inno-
vation’ (Rommetveit et al. 2013).
12. My defence of consequentialism differs from Grinbaum and Groves’ argument that the limited predic-
tive capacities of scientiﬁc knowledge results in a lack of moral capacity, which they call a ‘deﬁciency
that is inherent to the culture of consequentialism itself’ (Grinbaum and Groves 2013, 119–142).
13. Grinbaum and Groves explain – referring to Nordmann’s concept of ‘naturalized technologies’ – why
technology cannot deliver on its promise:
In societies that have become thoroughly dependent on advanced technologies, the background
of human action has changed. No longer coherently imaginable as Nature, eternal, and unchan-
ging, it has become an amalgam of natural processes and technological artefacts that intimately
interact with them. (2013, 119–142)
14. The – within research communities – frequently used strategy to compare the – (above all) ecological
and economic – characteristics of (the life cycle of) one product or process with those of other products
and processes, in order to allow society to select the ‘best’ ones, is, hence, but of little help to contribute
positively to sustainability challenges.
15. In order to enforce the resilience of science and innovation systems, also the monitoring results – i.e.
the effectiveness – of the variety of the solutions tried out by a diversity of local communities could be
documented, archived, and made accessible to both professional and non-professional knowledge
actors. This documented and archived variety is, in its turn, a useful database for further research
on more and less resistant causes and reasons for glocal sustainability challenges and on more and
less successful innovations.
16. Of course, since the speciﬁcity of citizens’ and organisations’ perspectives, visions, and interests is at
least partly related to the peculiarities of their cultural, political, and economic context, transcendence
thereof depends on opportunities to transform some restrictive contextual determinants. Looking for
and/or creating such opportunities can be considered a main role of responsible research and inno-
vation activities.
17. The legitimacy of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organisation rests on the faith in a further liberalisation of markets as a way to
increase – via free competition – societal beneﬁts (Maskus and Reichman 2004, 279–320).
18. Consider, as an example, recent ﬁgures in the Netherlands: since the 1980s the number of patents
requested by public research organisations increased with more than a factor of 14 (Horlings et al.
2013).
19. See, for instance, http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/optimal-circulation_en.htm and http://openaccess.
be/2013/10/14/report-14102013-ewi-focus-group-on-open-access/.
20. The concept of ‘endless frontier’ refers to the famous 1945 report of Vannevar Bush to the president of
the USA.
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